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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of ·Utah 
HAW AllAN EQUIPMENT CO·M-
PANY, LIMITED, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE EIMCO CORPO·RATION, a. 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appella.nt. 
Case, No. 
7188 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ~~~ 
t·'· 
I 
STATEMENT OF F AC:Ts 
This is an action for bre·ach of contract. As will appear 
from. the argument, it is of the highest importance in review-
ing this case that the Court have before it not only a state-
ment as to the pleadings and exhibits received in evidence, 
as set forth by appellant, but the situation of the parties 
and surrounding circumstances when the contract was 
made, as disclosed by the evidence. 
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For convenience the respondent hereinafter will be re-
ferred to as "Plaintiff" and appellant as "Defendant." 
'The plaintiff, ~awaiian Equipment C·ompany, Limited, 
is a corporation, organized and existing under the laws of 
the territory of Hawaii, with its principal office and place 
of business in Honolulu. It is engaged in carrying on the 
business of a dealer in machinery and equipment entirely 
within the Hawaiian Islands (R. 79, 80, 123 and 159). Some-
time during the latter part of June or the early part of 
July, 1946, it came to the attention of Malcolm Mac-
Naughton, president of Hawaiian Equipment ·Company, that 
certain pneumatic tools, known as chipping hammers and 
scaling hammers, stored in government warehouses at 
Honolulu in a section designated as "Salt Lake" and bearing 
classification numbers, were being offered for sale in Hon-
olulu by the United States Government as surplus property 
and he had received reports from employees under him as 
to the kind, condition and approximate quantities of the 
tools, so far as revealed by an inspection of part of the tools 
and from information obtained from representatives of the 
government (R. 80, 81, 94, 9:5, 128, 159 and 212). There-
upon, MacNaughton communicated with Samuel T·. Dickey, 
Vice President of Hawaiian Equipment ·Company, who was 
stationed at San Francisco, California. Dickey was re-
quested by MacNaughton to ascertain whether the.re might 
be firms on the mainland which would be interested in pur-
chasing: this surplus equipment (R. 81, 158 and 15H). 
In compliance with MacNaughton's communication, 
Dickey· endeavored to interest someone on the mainland in 
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the purchase of these tools (R. 159, 160). In this connection 
it should be pointed out that the government offering had 
to be acted on quickly; that there was no market in the 
Islands for any substantial part of these tools * * * 
"not 10% of them" * * * and that the Hawaiian 
Equipment Company had no facilities on the mainland 
whatsoever for marketing these tools (R. 80, 166, 167). 
In the course of his efforts to interest someone on the 
mainland in the purchase of these tools, Dickey, on August 
1, 1946, called The Eimco Corporation by telephone from 
San Francisco, California, and talked with its General Man-
ager, Joseph Rosenblatt, at Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 160, 
176, 227). 
Dickey furnished Rosenblatt the information which he 
had received from MacNaughton, concerning the tools and 
inquired whether Eimco would be interested in purchasing 
them. Dickey pointed out that if Eimco were interested, it 
must act quickly. Rosenblatt responded that the matter 
would be taken under advisement and he would let Dickey 
know whether Eimco was interested (R. 160-162, 177-178, 
186-187). 
The next day, August 2, 1946, Rosenblatt telephoned 
from Salt Lake City to Dickey in San Francisco and advised 
that Eimco wanted the tools and woulq pay 55% of their 
original cost to the government f.o.b. Honolulu. Dickey 
advised that he would cable that offer to his Honolulu office, 
which he did (R. 161, 187-188). 
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On August 5, 1946, and after receipt of Dickey's cable 
containing Rosenblatt's proposal, MacNaughton put through 
a telephone call from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Eimco at Salt 
Lake City, and a conversation was had concerning these 
tools participated in by MacNaughton and also Jack Blades, 
a Sales Engineer for Hawaiian Equipment Company, and 
by Rosenblatt of Eimco (R. 82). Upon identifying himself 
to Rosenblatt apd exchanging greetings, MacNaughton 
turned the telephone over to Blades ( R. 105) . Blades in-
formed Rosenblatt concerning the government offering, 
identifying it, and advising that the same consisted of ap-
proximately 2800 tools, packed in two hundred boxes and 
located in government warehouses at Pearl Harbor. Blades 
told Rosenblatt that he had inspected some of the tools and 
that those examined by him were of various standard makes 
and in good condition and that representatives of the gov-
ernment had assured him that all of the tools were new and 
in good condition. Rosenblatt indicated that Eimco could 
handle all of the tools and might be interested in other sur-
plus property (R. 123-12:7, 135, 141, 206-208). 
When Blades concluded; MacNaughton took the ·phone 
and explained· to Rosenblatt that he had received advise 
through Hawaiian , Equipment Company's San Francisco 
office that Eimco was interested in purchasing the tools 
at about 55·% of the original cost to the government, but 
that he could not accept this proposal, which came through 
Dickey, as a firm bid. Rosenblatt then affirmed Eimco's 
interest in the tools at about 55·% of government cost and 
MacNaughton ask~d him to "confirm this jnterest definitely 
with a positive price indication by cable" (R. 82, 105, 111). 
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In this connection it is interesting to note that the original 
cost of these tools to the government was $45.00 each for 
the chipping hammers and $37.50 each for the scaling ham-
mers, and figured at 55%, this amounts to $24.75 for the 
hammers and $20.625 for the scalers (R. 185). 
In response to MacNaughton's request for a firm com-
mittment at definite prices, Eimco, on August 7, 1946, 
cabled Hawaiian Equipment Company as follows: 
"Hawaiian Equipment c·ompany, Honolulu. 
"Reference hammers bid maximum 24 dollars each 
scalers 17.50 each Honolulu will take all. Eimco". 
(R. 84-85, Ex. A.) 
Upon receipt of this cable on August 8, ~946, Mac-
~ Naughton contacted the government and purchased the 
r. tools. On August 9, 1946, Hawaiian Equipment Company 
~ cabled Eimco as follows : 
''Joseph Rosenblatt 
The Eimco Corporation 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
In accordance your cable Hawaiian Equipment 
Company sells you sub.ject delivery from surplus ap-
proximately 99-2 chipping hammers. 183·61 scaling 
hammers 24 dollars and 17 Dollars each respectively 
f o b Honolulu preparing for shipment soon as pos-
sible. Will advise. MacNaughton". 
(R. 86'. Ex. B.) 
Eb Within half an hour or so after sending the above cable, 
/MacNaughton sent a further cable to correct a typographi-
l~~· 
·;;cal error, r'eading: 
:;., 
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"Joseph Rosenblatt 
The Eimco ·Corporation 
Salt Lake· C'ity, Utah 
Regret typographical error in cable scaler price 
should be 17.50 each Honolulu per your cable and not 
17. MacNaughton." 
(R. 87. Ex. C.) 
On the same day ·MacNaughton mailed a letter of con-
firmation to Eimco, in which Eimco was asked for shipping 
instructions (Ex. D. R. 88-90, 101-102, 108). 
No shipping instructions were given· by Eimco as re-
quested and Eimco refused to accept the goods and pay for 
them (R. 90). Under date of August 2·3, 194:6; Eimco sent 
a cable to Hawaiian Equipment Company advising, among 
other things, that Eimco had no interest in the matter. (Ex. 
E. R .. 92,). 
Commencing about the date of receipt of Eimco's cable 
of August 23, 19~6, and continuing for several months, up 
to about June of 1947, the parties, through their representa-
tives, carried on negotiations looking toward the sale and 
disposition of these tools on ,some basis that would avoid 
any loss to them or litigation (R. 91~9'3, 114, 173). Nothing 
came of these negotiations.· Thereafter this suit was com· 
menced by Hawaiian Equipment Company to recover dam· 
ages· for breach of. contract and upon a trial of such cause, 
the case was submitted to the jury on the issues made by the 
evidence under proper instructions by the trial court. A 
verdict was returned in favor of Hawaiian Equipment Com· 
pany (R .. 33:0~331). 
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II 
ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff's complaint alleges a written offer by 
defendant to purchase, and plaintiff's written acceptance 
thereof, and agreement to sell to the defendant, certain 
pneumatic scaling and chipping hammers. The undisputed 
evidence showing the situation of the parties and surround-
' ing circumstances taken together with the exchange of 
- cables (Ex. A. & B.) establish that Eimco agreed to pur-
chase from Hawaiian Equipment Company the entire 
quantity of certain pneumatic tools known as chipping and 
- scaling hammers, located in certain government ware-
houses under classification numbers and then being offered 
for sale by the government in Honolulu, the same being 
_ capable of positive identification as to make, kind and 
quantity. 
The make, kind and quantity of these surplus tools, 
- which constituted the subject of the contract as ascertained 
and identified, . are pleaded, and the undisputed evidence 
proves that the tools particularly described' in the complaint 
are the identical tools comprising the government offering 
and which defendant referred to and offered to purchase 
~ from plaintiff. 
The principal Issues and contentions relied upon by 
.. defendant to defeat this action were settled in the trial 
.. court and defendant now asks this court to upset the verdict 
and' judgment of the lower court on the grounds that there 
.-' 
r- is an insufficient memorandum to comply with the Statute 
of Frauds or assuming the memorandum sufficient, never-
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theless, there was lack of mutual assent. The argument to 
. follow will be devoted to the specific contentions of the 
plaintiff with respect. to these general propositions. 
i. DE:FENDANT~S WRITTEN OFFER SATISFIES THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS BY STATING THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF 
THE CONTRACT WITH REASONABLE' CERTAINTY. 
Defendant lays great stress upon the words in Exhibit 
"A" "Bid maximum," contending they show an agreement 
appointing plaintiff as defendant's agent with authority to 
purchase the goods at certain prices. The minutest search 
of the record in this case will fail to reveal that there was 
any serious effort to present, during the trial of this cause, 
any such issue to the effect that while the defendant denies 
it made a contract to purchase from plaintiff, still it admits 
making a contract appointing plaintiff its agent to acquire 
these goods from the government. That thought never en-
tered the head of either party for the reasons which will 
hereinafter appear. When Eimco was being pressed to 
accept the goods, its response was it "had no interest in the 
matter" (Ex. E, R. 92). Surely that is not a response of a 
principal to an agent, who has been duly authorized to pur-
chase merchandise on behalf of the principal. / 
The correct solution, of course, is to be found in the 
following circumstances. During the negotiations leading 
up to Eimco's telegraphi-c offer, Eimco had made a proposal 
through defendant's San Francisco office to buy from plain-
tiff at a certain percentage of the cost of the tools to the 
government. This didn't satisfy plaintiff's president, Mac-
Naughton, as being an acceptable offer and he asked Rosen-
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blatt to confirm Eimco's interest in these tools "definitely 
with a positive price indication by cable," and that is what 
Eimco did. Instead of couching its offer to buy at prices 
representing a certain percentage of government cost, it 
offered to buy at the best or highest price which it was 
willing to pay for the tools. This was a firm committment 
and plaintiff acted on it. Furthermore, in the telephone 
conversation MacNaughton had with Rosenblatt, as quoted 
in a subsequent portion of this brief, MacNaughton ex-
plained to Rosenblatt precisely plaintiff's position in the 
transaction (R. 83). 
In support of defendant's proposition that, · "The 
only construction possible is that instead of the cable being 
an offer to buy, it is in effect an authorization by appellant 
to respondent for the latter, as agent, to submit a bid to 
the surplus property office * * *,"defendant relies upon 
and quotes at great length a ·circuit Court of Appeals 
"" decision in the case of National Bank of Commerce vs. 
... Lambourne, et al., 2 Fed. (2d) 23. Counsel for defendant 
- in commenting on this case state, that the court "antici-
.- pating that at first blush, since the sugar was the same 
as the quantity and quality, the ruling might appear 
strained * * *." The ruling was strained, but no more 
so than the contentions made by defendant in this case, 
and the reasoning of that case was repudiated and the de-~ 
cision reversed on the same points for which the ·Circuit 
~~ 
Court decision is cited and relied upon by defendant . 
• 
~ 
276 U. S. 469, 48 Sup. Ct. 378, 72 L. Ed. 657. Such author-
~-
.. ities are of no value to this court and could result only in 
"' .. J 
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leading this court into the adoption of a refuted theory. 
·The case of Waggoner Refining Co. vs. Bell Oil & Gas 
Company (Okla.) 244 Pac. 756, cited by defend·ant at Page 
9 of its brief, which relies upon the Lambourne decision, 
concerns the application of the rule that where the seller 
is not willing and ready to abide by a material term of a-
contract, he cannot recover from the buyer. The court's at-
tention, however, should be called to the fact that there is 
nothing in the reported decision· indicating, as stated by 
~ounsel for defendant, that the term of the contract in ques-
tion was contained in a printed portion thereof. Nor does· 
a reading of the case disclose that the parties treated such 
term as immaterial as is defendant's version of the case. 
The court states: 
"Plaintiff is not in a position to insist that the 
contract was not breached on its part in a material 
particular, by its refusal to show the defendant as 
sh'i pper. The plaintiff evidently considered that 
portion of the contract as material, because the only 
reason it failed or refused to ship the gasoline as per 
shipping instructions, furnished in the telegram of 
defendant on June 30, was that it declined to ship 
the gasoline and show the defendant as shipper." 
However, counsel argues that assuming the court does 
not adopt their construction of what was meant by de-
fendant's cable, th~t is, an instruction to an agent to make 
a bid, (which agreement would not come within the Statute 
of Frauds) then, say counsel, the memorandum is ambiguous 
and, therefore, unenforceable because of the Statute. 
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The leading authority and author on contracts points 
out that even though all of the terms are included in a mem-
orandum or offer, they may be written in such an abbrevi-
ated way or with such brief description of the property that 
it is not apparent to an uninstructed·person what the mean-
ing of the writing may be. Williston on Contracts, (Rev. ed., 
Vol. 2, p. 1650, Section 576). The gener~l rule applicable 'to 
such cases is stated in the following; authorities: 
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 23-5, p. 3'24, 
reads: 
"The court in interpreting words or other acts 
of the parties puts itself in the position which they 
occupied at the time ~he contract was made. In 
applying the appropriate standard of interpreta-
tion even to an agreement that on its face is free 
from ambiguity it is permissible to consider the sit-
uation of the parties and the accompanying circum-
stances at the time it was entered into-not for the 
purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its 
terms, but to aid in determining the meaning to be 
given to the agreement." 
\ 
The rule is stated in a leading Massach~setts decision 
as follows: 
"While parole evidence is not competent to con-
tradict or vary the terms of such a memorandum to 
show what is intended, we are of the opinion that the 
situation of the parti~s and the surrounding circum-
stances at the time when the contract was made, 
may be shown to apply the contract to the subject 
matter." New England Wool Company vs. Standard 
Worsted .Company, 165 Mass. 328, 332, 43: N. E. 122:.) 
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In Brewer vs. Horst-Lachmund Company (127 ·Cal. 643, 
60 Pac. 418, 50 L. R. A. '240) the court held that a telegram 
by an agent to his principal, concerning purchase of hops, 
and the principals' telegram to the seller confirming the 
purchase constituted a sufficient memorandum for the Sta-
tute of F'rauds, and states: 
"If there was nothing to lool} to but the tele-
grams, the court might flnd it difficult, even impos-
sible, to determine the nature of the contract or that 
any contract was entered into between t:q.e parties. 
But the court is permitted to interpret the memor-
andum (consisting of the two telegrams) by the light 
of all the circumstances under which it was made; 
and if, when the court is. put into possession of all 
the knowledge which the parties: to the transaction 
had at the time, it can be plainly seen "from the mem-
orandum who the parties to the contract were, what 
the subject of the contract was, and what were the 
terms, then the court should not hesitate .to hold the 
memorandum sufficient." 
··Cases applying the general rule above stated will be~ 
cited in subsequent portions of this brief, but in the light of 
the evidence introduced in this case when applied to the 
words in question, there can be no doubt as to what Eimco 
intended. 
· Should counsel for Eimco contend, however, that these 
words create a doubt or ambiguity, then in resolving such 
doubt or ambiguity, the court need apply only the well 
established rule that the language or words of a written 
contract. are to be taken most strongly against the party 
using them. Our Supreme Court so held in Jordan vs. 
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Madsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570, which case involved an 
automobile dealer's contract, the language of which raised 
the question whether an automobile delivered to the dealer 
from the buyer was taken on a consignment _for sale or was 
sold outright to the dealer at a stated price. In this case 
which was appealed from an order sustaining a demurrer 
to the complaint, the Supreme Court held that if there were 
any ambiguity, it was to be resolved against the dealer, who 
was the maker of the contract. 
In the Idaho case of Stone vs. Bradshaw, 128 P·ac. (2d) 
844, a suit by a broker to recover commissions for the sale 
of ranch property, the memorandum involved contained the 
language: "I do not think the price is tuff. 3~5000 your com. 
5 per sent." The opinion reads (pg. 847-8) : 
"Respondents. argue that the wo.rd· 'plus' should 
be added to the language used in the letter to make it 
read 'I do not think the price is tuff. 3-5000 (plus) 
your com. 5 persent'. While upon the other hand, 
appellant argues that the word 'less' _should be added 
and the letter should read 'I do not think the price 
is tuff. 35000 (less) your com. 5: per sent.' 
"It will be remembered that the contract ·in-
volved here was prepared, and transmitted to appel-
lant, by respondents; that words were used in the 
contract concerning which doubt has arisen, and 
which are ambiguous and uncertain. In such cir-
cumstances the contract should be construed most 
s_trongly against the party preparing it or employi'ng 
the words concerning which doubt arises. * * * 
· "Testimony thus introduced merely defines or 
translates the language of the instrument. It does 
not vary or add to the terms of the writing and does 
not fall within the parol evidence rule. The testimony 
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is admitted for the purpose of ascertaining not only 
the meaning of the words· used, but the intention of 
the parties. as expressed in the writing. Here we are 
confronted with a dispute between the parties. as to 
the meaning of certain language used in the contract. 
Conceding, but. not admitting, that the words used 
a.re ambiguous and uncertain, and that different 
minds might well-reach different conclusions as to 
their meaning, in such a situation evidence may be 
received to ascertain the real intention of the parties. 
Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2, 4th Ed., § 455." 
.The Supreme Court of Utah applied the same rule in 
Boley vs. Butterfield, 194 Pac. 129, in holding that where 
a lease of ·a ·grazing per:mit contained a latent ambiguity as 
to whether the permit was exclusive or in common with 
other parties, evidence as to the understanding of the parties 
at the time it was executed. was admissible as it did not vary 
or alter the meaning but tended to explain the sense in which 
the terms of the instrument were understood. See also Penn 
Star Mining Co. vs. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 Pac. 107. 
2 .. DEF'END·ANT'S WRITTEN OFFER TO PURCHASE. SUF-
FICIE'NTLY DESCRIBES THE GOODS TO COM'PLY WITH THE 
STATUTE OFt F 1RAUD,S. 
Counsel for defendant argues at great length that the 
"memorandum" is insufficient to comply with the Statute, 
as it lacks cert.ainty as- to the prope~ty involved'. The un-
contradicted evidence establishes that defendant's tele-
graphic offer referred to the purchase of all the pneumatic 
scaling. and chipping ham-mers then being offered by the 
government as surplus property at Honolulu, Hawaii, which 
the record shows were located in government warehouses, 
packed in 200 boxes bearing government classification num-
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bers and, therefore, capable of exact identification as to 
quantity, models and makes (R. 126-128). 
The general rule applicable to this point already has 
been referred to and authorities cited. (See Restatement 
of Contracts, Section 235. Nezv England Wool Company vs. 
Standard liVorsted Company, supra). It is based on the 
maxim: "id certum est quod certum reddi potest}' The 
principle has been applied to contracts for the sale of goods 
in the following cases. 
In Bartlett-Heard and Cattle Company vs. Harris, 28 
Arizona 497, 238 Pac. 327, a telegraphic offer for the sale 
of heifers referred to them as "Lassen priced them to us at· 
80 dollars f.o.b. Phoenix" and also as "all the heifers you 
inspected." Held: "The necessity of parol evidence of all 
the cattle Lassen priced and of the ones Stonerod inspected 
does not make the memorandum insufficient." 
Northeastern Paper Compa~y vs. Concord Paper Co., 
214 App. D. 537, 212 N. Y. S. 218, holds that a contract for 
sale of all paper in rolls stored in seller's warehouse suf-
ficiently describes the prop.erty if it may be ascertained 
and located by extrinsic evidence. 
Zim.merman Bros. and Company vs. First Nat. Bank, 
219 Wisconsin 427, 263 Northwestern 361, is an interesting 
case because of the similarity of the factual elements to the 
present case. In negotiations between the plaintiff and de-
fendant for the purchase of safety deposit boxes by defend-
ant, plaintiff advised defendant that plaintiff had located 
approximately 1600 boxes whic:ti could be obtained from a 
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receiver of a suburban bank. Defendant wrote to plaintiff: 
"This will acknowledge your letter of June 26 
and also confirm our conversation over the telephone. 
In reference to the Park Ridge safety deposit boxes, 
we will ta.ke the boxes." 
Defendant subsequently attempted to cancel the order 
but in the meantime plaintiff had committed itself to pur-
chase the boxes from the receiver and after making an ef-
fort to dispose of the boxes withol!t loss, but without success, 
plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for breach of 
contract. H'eld that (pg. 361) : 
"The contention of the defendant that the mem-
orandum disclosed by the letters is insufficient be-
cause the goods are not sufficiently described is 
equally untenable. No more is required than that 
there must be reasonable certainty. The descriptions 
need not be so minute and exact as to exclude the 
possibility that some other goods than .those intended 
will also fall within the words of the writing." 
In Williams vs. A. C. Burdick and Company (Oregon) 
125 Pac. 844, 126 Pac. 603, the court held that a contract for 
the sale 9f prunes was completed upon an exchange of cer-
tain telegrams, although the ~cceptance made reference to 
mailing a contract. The telegraphic offer and acceptance 
referred to an entirely different grade of prunes, but the 
court resolved this doubt without difficulty by reference to 
a subsequent letter of the parties which, while not con-
stituting part of the contract, showed that the parties had 
in mind the same thing. The court says: 
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"Whether the 'mailing contract' referred to in 
the defendant's telegram related to 'thirties' or to 
'3.0-40s' cannot be detern1ined from an in~pection of 
the message. Any doubt on that subject, howeve,r, 
was resolved when the letter accompanying the con-
tract reached New York by mail several days after 
the receipt of the defendant's telegram." 
• 
In considering the authorities cited by defendant, we 
might state that we have no quarrel with the general rules 
announced therein. The question is one of their applicability 
or application of those rules to this case. In a case such as 
Kerbin vs. Bigland and Osbqrne vs. Moore, cited on Pages 
11 and 12 of defendant's brief, the courts, of course, hold 
that where the memorandum omits essential terms of the 
contract or is so indefinite and vague that the court, even 
with the aid of extrinsic evidence as to the surrounding 
circumstances, cannot ascertain the intention of the parties 
the Statute is not complied with. While it might be argued 
that Lewis vs. Elliott Bay Logging Company, 191 Pac. 803, 
cited by defendant, is not strictly in harmony with the great 
majority of cases on this point, still the memorandum in-
volved in that case makes no reference whatsoever to the 
quantity offered, whereas in the instant c~se, Eimco offered 
to "take all" the goods in question. In ·the Lewis case, the 
court says: "It should be noted that in appellant's letter the 
subject of sale is referred to simply as 'fir.' There is no 
mention of the quantity." 
·Cases such as Worthheimer vs. Klinger Mills (Ind.) 
25, NE (2d) 246, represent that class of case where the 
quantity is stated in the memorandum in indefinite terms 
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such as "bags," "bales," "cars," etc., and the prices are 
stated in different terms of measurement such as "bushels," 
"pounds," etc., and having no relationship to the indefinite 
statement as to the quantity. In these cases the courts 
generally hold that the statute is not satisfied, in the ab-
sence of evidence of any common usage or custom or past 
• dealings between the parties to show the sense in which 
such indefinite terms are used. See annotation 129 A. L. R. 
P'age 12)30. It will be noted that in this class of cases there 
is uncertainty as to both the quantity and price as one is 
dependent upon the other, and su9h uncertainty would have 
to be resolved by conflicting parol evidence. It is obvious 
that these cases are distinguishable from the case before 
this court as in this case the price per tool is specific and 
the tools involved as above demonstrated were capable of 
exact determination as to kind and quantity. 
3. PLAINTTF1F 1 MADE AN UNQUALIFIED .AJGGEPTANCE 
OF DE~FENDANT'S OF'FER. 
Defendant raises, for the first time on appeal, the con-
tention that the words "subject delivery from surplus" con-
tained. in "Exhibit B," imported a new term and rendered 
the acceptance conditional. Again we make no quarrel with 
the rule illustrated by the cited cases to the effect that an 
acceptance which imports a new term renders it conditional 
and is at most a counterproposal. As &Jtated by Williston: 
"A conditional acceptance is in effect a state-
ment that the offerree is willing to enter into a bar-
gain differing in some respect from that proposed 
in the original offer." (Williston on Contracts Rev. 
Ed. Volume 1, Section 77.) 
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The obvious answer to defendant's contention is that 
the words in question import no new term nor propose a · 
bargain differing in any respect from . that intended by 
Eimco and fully understood by both parties. Rosenblatt's 
cable refers to "hammers" and "scalers." The negotiations 
pending between the parties concerned solely certain pneu-
matic tools then being offered for sale by the government as 
surplus at Honolulu, and which it ,vas. understood that. de-
fendant would acquire from the government and sell to 
Eimco upon receipt of a firm ·committment. The words relied 
upon as rendering the offer condit~onal simply state-what 
was the understanding of both parties and clearly implicit 
in the offer. 
Exhibit "B" states in part: "In accordance your cable 
Hawaiian Equipment Company sells you * * * ." Can 
there be any clearer statement of the acceptance of an offer 
in accordance with the terms thereof? But, defendant con-: 
tends that the words following, "subject· to delivery from 
surplus" resulted in obligating "respondent only on condi-
tion that delivery can be made or obtained from surplus." 
In other words it is contended that "subject to delivery from 
surplus" amounted to a statement that the acceptance would 
not be effective until a certain contingency happened, name-
ly, the acquisition of the tools from the government. Assum-
ing for the purpose of argument, the correctness of this 
construction, still this would not preclude a binding con-
tract. Eimco immediately acquired the goods upon receipt 
of the offer. In such a case, Williston states the rule to be 
as follows: 
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"Where there is an acceptance which adopts un-
equivocally the terms of the offer but states that 
it will not be effective until a certain contingency 
happens or fails to happen, then if neither party 
withdraws and the delay is not unreasonable, a con-
tract will arise when the contingency happens." 
(Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Volume 1, Section 
77-A.) 
We submit, however, that the correct rule as applied to 
this case is contained in the following statement .by the same 
author: 
"Sometimes an acceptor from abundance of cau-
tion inserts a condition in his acceptance which 
merely expresses what would be implied in fact or 
in law from the offer. As such condition involves 
no qualification of the acceptor's assent to the terms 
of the offer, a contract is not precluded." 
In Shea vs. Second National Bank of Washington, 133 
Fed. 2nd 17, it was held : 
"Generally, an acceptance is not inoperative as 
such merely because it imposes a condition, if the 
requirement of the condition would be implied from 
the offer though not expressed therein." 
In Frederick Raft Company vs. Afurphy, 110 ·Connecticut 
234, 147 Atlantic 709, the defendant, a sub-contractor, sub-
. . 
mitted to plaintiff, the contractor, a bid on plumbing to be 
included as part of plaintiff's bid on the whole job, and 
plaintiff after learning of the a ward to him of the contract 
through the newspaper, telephoned the defendant that he 
had been awarded the contract and when officially notified, 
he would notify defendant. However, the defendant at-
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tempted to revoke before official notice was received by the 
contractor. The court held it was a binding acceptance by 
the contractor and stated: 
"That both offer and acceptance to become ef-
fectual only in the event that the plaintiff's bid was 
actually accepted and the contract awarded to it, 
did not detract from the mutuality of their under-
taking: The defendants had no right to withdraw 
from their agreement after the plaintiff had accepted 
their bid, though the contract had. not yet been 
awarded to it." 
Under the same argument to the effect that the accept-
ance was conditional and again for the first time on appeal, 
defendant contends that while the offer fixes the place of 
delivery at Honolulu, the acceptance by adding the words 
"f.o.b." rendered it conditional. This contention is so clear-
ly beyond any issue raised by the pleadings, the evidence, or 
brought to the attention o:£ the trial court, it should be en-
tirely ignored. The fact is that both parties understood 
that the sale was f.o.b. Honolulu. The goods were being 
purchased by Eimco for resale on the mainland at a profit. 
The abbreviation "f.o.b." has a well defined business mean-
ing of which many courts take judicial notice and as applied 
to this case meant that plaintiff would deliver the goods 
sold at Honolulu on board a vessel without charge to Eimco. 
(See annotation in 16 A. L. R. 597.) 
What possible new proposal rendering the acceptance 
conditional can be found in the statement that plaintiff 
would pay the charges for handling the goods until they 
were put on board a vessel for shipment to Eimco.? When 
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plaintiff confirmed its acceptance by letter mailed the same 
day (Exhibit D) and asked defendant for shipping instruc-
tions, did plaintiff reply to the effect that it refused to be 
bound because it understood that the goods were to be de-
livered at Honolulu and that defendant and not plaintiff was 
- to pay the handling expenses in putting them on board ship? 
'In concluding his argument that the acceptance was 
conditional, counsel for defendant say: "This is not a case 
in which appellant welched from a bargain as respondent 
attempts to establish." 
May we state that there is nothing in this record in-
dicating that we have claimed anything beyond the fact that 
Eimco breached a bargain entered into with Hawaiian 
Equipment Company. Any implications contained in the 
word "welch" beyond that are purely 'counsels' conceptio·n 
of the situation. But, opposing counsel say not only did 
Eimco not "welch" from a bargain, but plaintiff's "action 
smacks of bad faith." May we respectfully ask the court's 
indulgence for a brief glance at the record? 
Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract. Defendant 
filed an answer under oath which reads like a treatise on 
defenses to breach of contr~ct (R. 7-10). Defendant denies 
first that it entered into a contract. It then pleads the 
statute of frauds. It claims further a breach of warranty, 
which it abandoned at the trial, and also fraud on the part of 
plaintiff which has been resolved by the verdict of the jury. 
Doubtless, anticipating that these defenses might be of no 
avail, defendant further pl~ads and offers to prove that 
admitting it entered into a contract, nevertheless it was 
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acting in this transaction as a disclosed agent for Charles 
M. Weinberg's company at Los Angeles, California, known 
as the Brown-Bevis Equipment Company, or, if this defense 
failes, then asserts defendant, Mr. Joseph Rosenblatt may 
have made a contract but he had no authority to act for the 
Eimco Corporation of which he was general manager, 
therefore, Hawaiian Equipment Company will have to look 
to Rosenblatt personally for any damages suffered ·in this 
transaction. Still further, says defendant, if the above 
ideas on agency are not acceptable to the court and it isn't 
established that Eimco was acting as agent for Weinberg's 
company, or that Rosenblatt had no authority to deal for 
Eimco, defendant has in reserve a further defense viz: 
that Eimco did not offer to buy from Hawaiian Equip-
ment Company-it merely appointed Hawaiian Equipment 
Company as its agent. 
Defendant's ingenuity was not exhausted by the 
above propositions as it has brought forth some new ideas 
on appeal such as the assertion that the acceptaNce was con-
ditional because it imported an entirely new term in the 
bargain contrary to what was intended by defendant. And, 
in conclusion, and should the above contentions be.' not 
sustained, nevertheless, claims defendant, plaintiff's action 
in promptly acting on defendant's offer and laying out in 
cold cash approximately $46.,000 in reliance thereon and its 
prompt acceptance by cable as clearly· required by the offer 
"smacks of bad faith." We submit that as to this accusation 
the record speaks for itself. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4·. T·HERE wAS· A MEETING OF' MINDS ON ALL THE 
ES8EN.TIAL T'ER.MS OF T·HE CONTRACT. 
At the outset we desire to bring to the court's atten-
tion clearly the precise propositions argued and relied upon 
by defendant in the concluding part of its brief as they are 
. stated and we understand them, and as they will be answered 
in the argument to follow. 
Point "5" of defendant's argument is that: "The court 
~rred in refusing to direct a verdict for app~llant and in 
refusing to grant appellant's motion for new trial," and as 
a ground therefor, it is stated: "These assigned errors go to 
the same question as the errors in admitting in evidence 
Exhibits "A" and "B", and also as to the question of the 
insufficiency of tp.e evidence to sustain the verdict, one of 
. the grounds of the motion for new trial." Since, as pointed 
out by d~fendant, these assigned errors go to the same 
questions which already have been argued, there is no 
reason ror reiteration of our points and authorities on said 
propositions~ 
Point "6" of defendant's argument is that: "The evi-
dence shows that as a matter of law there was no contract 
as there was no .meeting of minds." If, as contended, the 
evidence affirmatively shows as a matter of law there was 
no 'contract as there was no meeting of minds, then, of 
course, the trial court should have directed a verdict for 
defendant, as this suit is founded on contract. 
In the first place we wish to call the court's attention to 
the fact that the pleadings nowhere support the contention 
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that Hawaiian Equipment Company was acting as agent fo~ 
Eimco in these transactions. It is stated under oath in de-
fendant's answer : 
"That the defendantJ was at all times, in the 
transactions alleged in the complaint, the agent for 
Brown-Bevis E·quipment Company of Los Angeles, 
California, and that the fact that defendant was so 
acting as agent was at all times, known to the plain-
tiff herein~'' (R. 9.) 
This defense, which was unavailing, and for that matter 
not argued -in this court, nevertheless, ·is absolutely incon-
sistent with defendant's present contention and counsel 
realized this in his carefully worded ground for a directed 
verdict, which is the only ground embodying its contention 
that there was no meeting of the minds. Note the exact 
words of counsel on this point : 
''Conceeding that said two cables constituted an 
offer and ~acceptance to buy and sell, they did not 
result in a valid contract, because there was no 
meeting of the minds." (R. 3~7.) 
If the cables constituted an offer and acceptance to 
buy and sell wherein was there no meeting of the minds? 
We have hereinabove demonstrated that Exhibits ''A" and 
"B", when considered in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made as required by the authorities are 
definite and certain as to the essential terms of the bargain, 
namely, the parties, the goods,· the prices and the place of 
.tc delivery. Nothing would be gained by rearguing this subject. 
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If as has been argued, Exhibit "A." standing alone 
' / 
appears ambiguous, the _answer is that no ambiguity re-
mains when ·the evidence surrounding its making is con-
sidered, as it is proper to do. This· is supported in the Utah 
Supreme Court decision cited by defendant, Tynge vs. Con-
stant-Loraine investment Company, 47 Utah 330, 50 Utah 1, 
in which telegrams ,concerning an option for the sale of 
real estate described the same as "property West side State 
Street" and the court said "It was competent to aid the am-
biguity by extrinsic evidence which the parties were per-
mitted to. do." However, this decision is not an authority 
for the proposition that if, as claimed by defendant, the 
language of the written offer, standing alone, is obscure or 
ambiguous, then the court, as a matter of law and without 
resort to extrinsic evidence, must hold there is no contract 
as there is no meeting of the minds. To be logical that is the 
position that defendant must take, no matter how unten-
able, because when the extrinsic evidence herein refered 
to is applied ~o the cables, it not only does not show as a 
matter of law that Exhibit "A" w.as intended as an agency 
contract, but affirmatively shows that it was intended by 
defendant and understood by plaintiff as an offer to pur-
chase and this is conceded by defendant in predicating his 
request for a directed verdict on the ground that there was 
no meeting of the minds. 
We have already called attention to the well settled rule 
of construction which requires that if the words "bid. max-
imum" are ambiguous as claimed by defendant, then the 
language used. by defendant must be taken most strongly 
against it. However, there is no need to rely entirely on 
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this rule of construction as the record contains affirmative 
evidence showing that there was no misunderstanding by 
the parties as to the meaning of Exhibit "A" and this being 
so appellant cannot maintain its assigned error that there 
was no meeting of the minds as a matter of law. 
I 
This is the evidence: Hawaiian Equipment Company 
was a dealer in machinery engaged in buying and selling it 
at a profit which was known to defendant ( R,. 86, 15~:). 
This was the purpose of its organization and there is no 
evidence that it had ever acted in the capacity of 
broker or factor. The telegram (Exhibit A) was sent as 
the result of a request made to Eimco for a firm bid to 
Hawaiian Equipment Company and with a full exptana-
tion of the latter's position in the transaction. 
A few days prior to MacNaughton's request for a firm 
bid at positive prices, Rosenblatt phoned plaintiff's San 
Francisco office and advised plaintiff's representative sta-
tioned there, Samuel T. Dickey: 
"Q. Now, what else did Mr. Rosenblatt say to 
you on that occasion? 
A. That is all. It was a very short conversa-
tion. He said, 'We want the chippers and scalers. 
We offer 55- per cent of their cost to the, original 
cost to the government, f. o. b. Honolulu.' 
And I said, 'Fine; I will cable that out to my 
office today, my Honolulu office today.'" (R. 188~) · 
On direct examination Rosenblatt testified concerning 
his conversation with Dickey: 
· "Q. Now, Mr. Rosenblatt, will you tell the court 
and jury what Mr. Dickey said to you on the occasion 
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of that telephone call? 
A. Well, when Mr. Dickey called he introduced 
himself as being with the Hawaiian Equipment Com-
l?any. 
He said he had heard from his people in Hono-
lulu, that the government was offering a quantity of 
pneumatic tools out of surplus, and he asked me if 
we would be interested in buying them." (R. 229.) 
MacNaughton's testimony, which stands uncontradicted 
in the record, discloses .,that on August 5, 1946, two days 
before Eimco's cable, MacNaughton advised Rosenblatt, 
during· a telephone conversation, as follows: 
· "A. I also explained to him what our position 
in the tranaction would be. 
Q. What, if anything, did you say in that ex-
planation? 
A. Namely, that we wanted to get a positive 
price from him, and that, if we were able, the Ha-
waiian Equipment Company, to purchase the tools 
for less than that price, the difference between what 
he gave to us and what we had to pay the Govern-
. ment would represent our profit in the transaction. 
He said that was all right, that he would confirm 
the price by cable, which he did within a day or two." 
(R. 83.) 
As a part of defendant's cross examination regarding 
the same matter, MacNaughton testified: 
"A. I identified myself, as soon as I came on 
the phone, and turned the phone over to Mr. Blades. 
When Blades was through with his conversation, I 
then came on the telephone and explained to him in 
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some detail our position in this business, that we 
were getting a bid from him for these tools, from 
him, as representing the Eimco Corporation, for 
these tools ; we were going· to take that bid, and then 
if we could buy the tools from the government for 
anything less than that bid, the difference between· 
those two prices represented our profit. 
Mr. Rosenblatt indicated that that was all right, 
indicated an interest in the tools at about 55> per cent 
of government cost. 
"Ve asked,him if he would confirm this interest 
definitely vvith a positive price indication, by cable, 
and the matter was concluded and the cable came 
two days later, or three days." (R. 105.) 
After the exchange of cables and letters of confirma-
tion, the record shows that the next communication sent by 
Eimco to Hawaiian Equipment Company was Eimco's tele-
gram of August 23, 1946, which reads: 
"Salt Lake City, Utah, August 23rd. 
MacNaughton 
Hawaiian Equipment Co Honolulu 
Rosenblatt vacationing refer your letter August 9th 
, to Weinberg Brown-Bevis Company in accordance 
Rosenblatts letter to you August 7th Eimco Corpora-
tion itself has no interest this matter. (Signed) 
Eimco". (R. 92, Exhibit A.) 
It must be remembered that if Exhibit "A" was a direc-
tion from a principal to an agent to make an offer on behalf 
nf the principal it req~ired no acceptance other than the 
acquisition of the goods from the government at the prices 
specified. Is it reasonable to suppose that during subsequent 
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negotiations of the parties continuing for several months 
and looking toward the sale and disposition of these tools to 
avoid loss or litigation, that Eimco offered to take them 
off its alleged principal's hands for the price paid to the 
government plus an agent's commission (concerning which 
latter the record is silent) ? (R. 91-9'3, 114, 173). 
Of course, the answer to all these questions is that Ex-
hibit "A", when read in the light of the evidence, was sent 
in response to plaintiff's request for a firm committment 
and simply meant and was intended to mean that Eimco 
offered to purchase the goods from Hawaiian Equipment 
Company, and that the price offered by Eimco was $17.50 
each for the scaling hammers, and $24.00 each for the 
chipping hammers (and not 55l}o of the original cost to the 
government as had been indicated by Eimco in previous 
negotiations.) 
There is no point in lengthening this brief by taking 
up and discussing each case cited by defendant under this 
subject, as they stand for the rule illustrated by the famous 
Raffles case, which holds that when the extrinsic circum-
stances are applied to the express language of the contract 
and it is. rendered ambi.guous because equally applicable to 
two different subjects, then, if it is further established to 
be the fact that both parties intend in good faith to con-
tract with reference to different subjects a contract is pre-
cluded, as there is a lack of mutual assent. However, it 
should be noted that if, in such a case, the fact is established 
that both parties intend to contract with respect to the same 
subject, then, regardless of the latent ambiguity, a contract 
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results. 
An interesting comment on the Raffles case is found 
in Williams vs. A. C. Burdick & Co. (supra) which reads 
as follows: 
"Thus a text-writer in discussing this subject 
and referring to the c·ase of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 
2· H. & C. 906, says: 'The defendant agreed to buy, 
and the plaintiff agreed to sell, a cargo of cotton, 
"to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay". There were 
two such vessels sailing from Bombay, one in ·octo-
ber; the other in December. The plaintiff meant 
the latter; the defendant the former. It was held 
that the defendant was not bound to accept t~e cot-
ton. It is commonly said that such a contract is void, 
because of mutual mistake as to the subject-matter, 
,and because, therefore, the parties did not consent 
to the same thing. But this way of putting it seems 
to be misleading. The law has nothing to do with the 
actual state of parties' minds. In contract, as else-
where, it must go by externals, and judge parties 
by their conduct. If there had been but one "Peer-
less," and the defendant had said "Peerless" by, mis-. 
take, meaning "Peri" he would have been bound.' " 
Holmes' Com. Law. 309. 
Furthermore these cases are not authority for defend-
ant's argument that if the expressed language as contained 
in the offer (Exhibit A) appears obscure when unaided by 
extrinsic evidence, then as a matter of law there is no con-
tract. But, defendant is driven to this untenable position 
because, as pointed out above, when the court is .placed in 
the position of the parties and reads Exhibit "A" in the 
light of their knowledge and the attendant circumstances, 
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the evidence does not show, as defendant assigns error: 
"That as a matter of law there was no contract as there was 
no meeting of the minds," but discloses that both parties 
intended a contract of purchase and sale, and not one of 
agency. 
In concluding this subject, we wish to call attention to 
a fundamental judicial principal that where the evidence 
considered as a whole manifests an intention of the parties 
to arrive at a bargain, a construction will be given to the 
transaction, if possible, which will establish a valid con-
tract rather than defeat one. 
In Dick vs. Voggt (Okl.) 16·2 Pacific 2d 3·25, it is said: 
"Peculiarly applicable to the facts, disclosed by 
the, record in this -case is the first paragraph of the 
syllabus to the case of Schoene v. Hicks et al., 16~2 
Okl. 2.9-4, 23- P. 2d 170: 'In determining the question 
of the existence of a contract, the court will consider 
the acts, conduct, and statements of the parties as 
a whole, and, if it appears that there was a meeting 
of minds on all of the essential elements of the con-
tract, and an intention on the part of both parties 
to enter into a contract upon clear and unequivocal 
terms, and one of the parties in good faith has acted 
in reliance upon the alleged contract, the court 
should construe the facts to constitute a contract 
rather than to defeat one.' " 
In Schoene vs. Hicks et al., 16·2 Oklahoma 294, 23 P·ac. 
2d 170, which is cited in the above case, it is stated: 
"In the interest of sound business policy the 
courts have laid down the following rule : 'In deter-
mining whether the facts present the elements of a 
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contract, if a bona fide intent on both sides to come 
to a definite agreement is shown, it should be con-
strued, if possible, to constitute an agreement rather 
than to defeat one.' Neilson & Kittle Canning Com-
pany v. F. G. Lowe & Co., 149 Tenn. 561, 260 S. W. 
142. See, also, Empire Rubbe.r Manufacturing Com-
pany v. Morris, 73 N. J. Law, 602, 6~5 A. 4·50; 13 
c. J. 114." 
The same rule was applied by this court in Allen vs. 
Bessinger and Company, 62 Utah 226·, 219 Pac. 539, which 
upheld a contract where the plaintiff offered to furnish a 
copy of the official report of certain Interstate Commerce 
Commission's proceedings and defendant's response to the 
- offer was that: "We will be_ interested in your official re-
port of the definite changes in the handling of freight~ and 
.. 
-· would ask that you put our name down for a copy of same." 
III 
CONCLUSION 
We have endeavored, as we should, to confine our 
__ argument to the errors assigned and points argued by de-
r fendant, and in summarizing we will do the same. 
1. Defendant's first point is that the court erred in 
admitting Exhibit "A" as not setting forth the essential 
.~ terms of the contract with the certainty required by the 
Statute of Frauds. Under the authorities, the court, in con-
.-~. sidering Exhibit "A", must place itself in the position of the -
,.'.;•' 
•' 
•' 
parties, and, having done so, Exhibit "A", in the light of 
the situation of the parties, their knowledge and the attend-
icy: ing circumstances, states the essential terms of the contract 
! ~J( with reasonable certainty. 
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2. Defendant, for the first time, on appeal, makes the 
contention that plaintiff's acceptance, as contained in Ex-
hibit "B", is conditional as importing new terms not con-
tained in the. offer. The acceptance was unequivocal, and 
the so-called "new terms" were not new, but implied hi the 
offer and an integral part of the bargain as understood by 
both parties, and, therefore, under the authorities, did not 
render the offer conditional. We have . also called the 
court's attention to the fact that, though we accept the 
strained construction of defendant, that the acceptance was 
not to become effective until the happening of a contingency, 
namely, the acquisition of th~ goods from surplus, neverthe-
less, a contract is not precluded and came into existence upon 
defendant's obtaining the goods from the government. 
3. Defendant assigns as error the admission of. Ex-
hibit "C" which is merely the correction of a typographi~al 
error in Exhibit "B" to which it refers and which was sent 
a half hour or so after Exhibit "B". Exhibit "B", having 
been properly admitted," there can be no question as to the 
admissibility of Exhibit "C". 
4. Error is assigned in admitting Exhibit "D" be-
cause it was merely a confirmation of the cablegrams be-
tween the parties after the offer and acceptance had been 
made. Nothing more is claimed for it, but to that extent it 
w_as competent and material for consideration by the trial 
court. 
5. Inasmuch as appelh:.~nt's assignment of error to the 
court's refusal to ~irect a verdict for defendant and grant 
a new trial is stated to be repe~i~ious of the same questions 
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raised by the above assignment of errors respecting the ad-
mission of Exhibits "A" and "B", we will so treat it in this 
summary. 
6. Defendant's concluding assignment of error is that 
"The evidence shows that, as a matter of law there was :no 
contract as there was no meeting of minds," the argument 
being that the words "bid maximum" contained in Exhibit 
"A", "are clearly indicative of an authorization of plaintiff 
to bid for and on behalf of defendant." We have directed. the 
court's attention to the fact that this point also, is raised 
for the first time on appeal because counsel, in his request 
~· for a directed verdict for lack of meeting of minds predicates 
I-
it on the concession "that said two cables constituted an 
offer and acceptance to buy and sell" (R. 2·53). However, 
we have shown further that Exhibit "A", when aided by ex-
trinsic evidence as was proper under ~he decisions of this 
court and other jurisdictions, was intended by· defendant 
and understood by plaintiff as an offer to buy and not as 
an appointment of plaintiff as agent. In this connection it 
has been shown that the words "bid maximum" were noth-
. ing more than Eimco's response to Hawaiian Equipment 
p: ·Company's request for a firm committment at positive 
... prices, as Hawaiian Equipment Company did not care to 
::r deal in the matter of price on the basis of a certain percent-
.~. age of the original cost to the government, ·as had been the 
basis of Eimco's previous proposals. during the preliminary 
negotiations. 
ar;: We respectfully submit, therefore, that the errors as-
~qrl signed to the proceedings had in the trial court are without 
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basis in law as announced by the decisions of this court and 
the authorities generally, and the ve'rdict and judgment of 
the lower court should be affirmed. 
W. W. RAY 
C. E. HENDERSON 
Of Counsel 
Respectfully submitted, 
1:~NGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS & JONES , 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and) R·espondent. 
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